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Abstract. This paper examines the relationship of corruption with 
democracy and bureaucracy in the 82 countries in a panel framework. 
For the analysis we use rule of law, regulatory quality, control over 
corruption and secondary school enrollment ratio as control variables. 
We find that democracy, rule of law and control over corruption 
decreases the level of corruption. When we allowed for interaction effect 
among independent variables we find the evidence of strong interaction 
effect between all of the explanatory variables. We also find that, 
surprisingly, higher democracy and rule of law are positively associated 
with the level of corruption while higher bureaucracy negatively. 
 
Keywords: corruption; democracy; bureaucracy; panel data. 
 
JEL Codes: F35, C23, G39. 
REL Codes: 13I, 13J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Applied Economics 
Volume XIX (2012), No. 9(574), pp. 17-28 Aviral Kumar Tiwari 
 
18 
1.  Introduction  
Corruption is everywhere. Every country either developed or developing 
is suffering from the negative consequences of the corruption; of course the 
level of corruption is different in different countries. Myint (2000) has correctly 
said that corruption occurs in all countries “both developed and developing, in 
the public and private sectors, as well as in non-profit and charitable 
organizations.” Though the phenomenon of corruption exist in each country, 
disregarding the level of severity of the problem, it is common in developing 
countries up such an extent that it is regarded as a way of life in Nigeria, it has 
become culture of Sierra Leone and in Sudan it is treated as fifth factor of 
production (Hwedie, 2000). Corruption is a multi-faced term and it is very 
difficult to give precise definition of it. Johnston (1999) defines it as “misuse of 
public power for private benefits, e.g., bribing of public officials, kickbacks in 
public procurement, or embezzlement of public funds”. However, Transparency 
International (1999) has widened its scope by focusing its existence in private 
sector too. Transparency International (1999) defines corruption as “giving or 
receiving undue advantage in the course of business activities leading to acts in 
breach of a person's duties”. Further, we can argue that it is the public sector 
which plays crucial role in providing the conducive environment (by creating 
necessary institutional and market conditions) and for nurture of corruption not 
only in the domain of public sector activities but also in the sphere of private 
sector activities. Therefore, in such cases it creates a possibility for the 
Principle-Agent problem wherein the core difficulty lies in the mechanism to 
monitor the actions of those to whom authority is delegated but where the 
information is possessed asymmetrically by the agent. 
Akcay (2002) has mentioned several causes due to which it arises like 
widespread poverty, low level of public sector salaries, lack of well developed 
labour market, lack of risk spreading mechanism etc. Corruption affects 
negatively our each aspect of socio-economic life and political and institutional 
activities of the nations. Corruption is multidimensional term which may exist 
in any form like bribery, fraud, extortion, nepotism, insider trading, 
embezzlement, and so on and so forth. Its impact is not only limited to the size 
of the payments involved, but the very process of extorting and giving bribes 
has distortionary effects that are socio-economic  and political, even in terms of 
economic growth. In fact corruption reinforces bureaucratic delays. Corruption 
has a more distortionary impact on the economy than taxation, because of the 
need to keep corruption secret. Efforts to avoid detection and punishment cause 
corruption to be more distortionary than taxation. Further, corruption slows 
down investment and economic growth, raises the cost of doing business, Corruption, democracy and bureaucracy  
 
19
creates opportunities for delays for the work to be done and unnecessary 
requirements by official, discourages new ideas and innovations, promotes 
inequality among firms, reduces the quality of products, creates opportunities to 
divert funds from investment and other production activities, loss of faith on the 
part of the people and thus its legitimacy and power, strengthens bad 
governance (through the absence of the rule of Law, respect for human rights, 
no accountability, and transparency), weakness of structure and institutions 
which is crucial for better governance and so on and so forth.  
Therefore, recognizing the role played by corruption in every aspect of 
our life and in every sphere of organizational activities in all nations the present 
study is attempting to seek out a relationship of corruption with democracy and 
bureaucracy. For the analysis we used data of 82 countries for the period 2002 
to 2007 in panel framework.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
nd attempts to establish 
a relationship among corruption, democracy and bureaucracy followed by 
discussion on data source, variables definition and methodology adopted for 
empirical analysis in section 3
rd. In section 4
th results of data analysis have been 
presented followed by conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis in section 5
th.   
 
2.  Relationship of corruption with democracy and bureaucracy  
 
There are certain questions that need to address before going for conduct 
analysis. For example, whether there is any relationship between corruption and 
democracy? If yes, then whether democratic countries are less corrupt? 
Addressing on these issues Paldam (1999) finds that there is negative 
relationship between corruption and the level of democracy. He added that 
since there is strong interaction of democracy with pattern of transition and 
vice-versa too, therefore the independent effect of democracy on corruption is 
uncertain. Akcay (2002) has mentioned that more democratic nations are less 
corrupt because of two reasons. First, democratic regimes posses effective 
democratic governance system, rule of law, accountability, transparency and 
access whereas undemocratic regimes do not. Second, democratic regime 
embraces those leaders who have political will to address corruption and create 
the environment in which civil organization can deal with corruption, and 
support anticorruption activities. Similar argument is put forward by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) who says that countries with more political competition 
have stronger public pressure against corruption – through laws, democratic 
elections, and even independent press – and so, are more likely to use 
government organizations that contain rather than maximizes corruption Aviral Kumar Tiwari 
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proceeds. Therefore, we can conclude that democracy is negatively related with 
corruption.  
Bureaucracy, in simple words is defined as “rules by officials”. Roth and 
Wittich (1978) said that Max Weber argued that bureaucracy would increase 
fairness that minimizes nepotism and other types of public corruption and not 
only this, he added, it is most efficient administrative structure  for achieving 
organizational goals rationally.  Hope (1985) admitted that over the years span 
of state activities has expanded which has resulted in an expanding bureaucracy 
with increasing discretionary power which is abused for personal benefit 
contributed to the bureaucratic corruption in developing countries. Therefore, 
we can conclude that bureaucracy is positively associated with corruption.  
 
3.  Methodology, variables description and data source  
This study focuses on establishing the relationship among corruption, 
democracy and bureaucracy. For the analysis purpose data from 82 countries 
has been employed covering period of 2002 to 2007. In this study we have 
preferred panel data analysis technique as it has an advantage of containing “the 
information necessary to deal with both the intertemporal dynamics and the 
individuality of the entities being investigated” (Dielman, 1989).
(1)  
In the study we measure corruption by Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). CPI is calculated by a Transparency International, a German based 
international agency since 1999. This agency constructs CPI by collecting 
information on perception of resident of a country belonging to almost each 
class of the society.  The index ranks nations on a scale from 10 to 0; value near 
to 10 represents lower level of corruption and value closer to 0 represents 
higher level of corruption.  
Government Effectiveness (GE) index is used as a proxy to measure 
bureaucracy. GE captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Democracy is proxied by Voice and Accountability (VA) index. VA 
captures the perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 
Further, while measuring the relationship among corruption, democracy 
and bureaucracy it is imperative for analysis that we should use some control 
variables so that estimated parameters represent true values and results will be 
reliable. Therefore, we used Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (SSER), Rule Corruption, democracy and bureaucracy  
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of Law (RL), Regulatory Quality (RQ) and Control over Corruption (CC) as 
control variables. RL measure the extent to which agents abide the roles of 
society. Examples include perceptions of crime, effectiveness and predictability 
of the judiciary and enforceability of contracts. RQ captures the perceptions of 
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. And CC 
captures the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. According to The World 
Bank (2007), the governance indicator scores are measured between -2.50 and 
2.50 over time with lower scores indicating poor achievements and vice versa. 
Data for CPI is obtained from official website of Transparency International and 
for rest of variables from official website of World Bank on 14 August, 2010.  
By incorporating the above mentioned variables the evaluation of a 
pooled OLS regression can be specified as follows: 
, ) SSER (
) CC ( ) RL ( ) RQ ( ) GE ( ) VA ( CPI
it it 6
it 5 it 4 it 3 it 2 it 1 0 it
   
            
      (1) 
where i represents country, t represents time, and the remainder is error term, 
it  , which is assumed to white noise and varies over both country and time.  
 
However, while using a pooled OLS regression, countries’ unobservable 
individual effects are not controlled therefore; heterogeneity of the countries 
under consideration for analysis can influence measurements of the estimated 
parameters (Bevan, Danbolt, 2004). Further, using a panel data model with 
incorporation of individual effects has a number of benefits; for example, 
among others, it allows us to account for individual heterogeneity. Indeed, 
developing countries differ in terms of their colonial history, their political 
regimes, their ideologies and religious affiliations, their geographical locations 
and climatic conditions, not to mention a wide range of other country-specific 
variables (Serrasqueiro, Nunes, 2008). And if this heterogeneity is not taken 
into account it will inevitably bias the results, no matter how large the sample 
is. Therefore, by incorporating countries’ unobservable individual effects in 
equation (1) the model to be estimated is as follows:  
, w ) SSER (
) CC ( ) RL ( ) RQ ( ) GE ( ) VA ( CPI
it it 6
it 5 it 4 it 3 it 2 it 1 0 it
  
            
     (2) 
where  , it i it w     with  i  being countries’ unobservable individual effects. 
The difference between a polled OLS regression and a model considering Aviral Kumar Tiwari 
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unobservable individual effects lies precisely in i  . Further, for the analysis we 
have used interaction terms also among different explanatory variables meaning 
thereby happening of the one variable is conditioned upon the happening of 
other variable as most of the explanatory variables are interrelated.  
 
4.  Estimation and empirical results 
 
Results of panel data models without incorporating interaction effect have 
been presented in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Regression results of panel data models 
Panel data models: Dependent variable is CPI; standard errors in parenthesis  
Independent 
variables 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
FE-CS RE-CS  FE-CSW  FE-AR(1) 
VA 
0.2524584 *  
(0.1402519) 
-0.1036442 
(0.1019085) 
0.294245*** 
(0.064621) 
0.1919063  
(0.1302277) 
GE 
-0.1348335 
(0.1547716) 
0.1200345 
 (0.1553502) 
-0.077756 
(0.075309) 
-0.1226464  
(0.1311539) 
RQ 
0.3188907 * 
(0.1652857) 
0.0878837  
(0.1370919) 
0.368447*** 
(0.072174) 
0.3607853** 
(0.1463432) 
RL 
0.3078712  
(0.1871726) 
0.6690767*** 
(0.1569469) 
0.205596** 
(0.098505) 
-0.0794106  
(0.1668407) 
CC 
0.2716615 ** 
(0.1375291) 
1.270768*** 
(0.1289728) 
0.169528*** 
(0.064831) 
-0.0254112  
(0.1224076) 
SSER 
0.0003188  
(0.0032015) 
0.0049142** 
(0.0021643) 
0.001595 
(0.000995) 
0.0085983** 
(0.003701) 
C 
4.425342*** 
(0.2749966) 
3.746236*** 
(0.1743174) 
4.316718*** 
(0.088203) 
3.95983*** 
(0.1215182) 
Model summary  
R2 overall   0.8707  0.9368  0.985634  0.6560   
Hausman test     659.34***     
Fixed effect(F-test)  12.30 ***      5.53*** 
Wald chi2   2145.30***     
Country included  82  82  82  82 
Total observations  492  492  492  492 
Notes: 1. The Hausman test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that 
unobservable individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables, against the 
null hypothesis of correlation between unobservable individual effects and the explanatory 
variables. 2. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of insignificance as 
a whole of the parameters of the explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of 
significance as a whole of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 3. The F test has normal 
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of insignificance as a whole of the cross-section 
dummies incorporated in the analysis. 4. ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % 
level of significance, respectively. 5. EF, CS, CSW, RE and AR(1) denotes fixed-effect, cross-
section, cross-section-weights, random effect and auto regressive first order. 6. [----] denotes 
results are not computed. 
 Source: Author’s calculation. Corruption, democracy and bureaucracy  
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From Table 1, it is evident that in model 1 coefficients of VA, RQ and CC 
are statistically significant with positive sign indicating that increase in these 
variables increase the score of CPI, hence the level of corruption will come 
down. Model 2, which is based on random effect approach, reviles that, 
contrary to fixed effect results, RL, CC and SSER have significantly positive 
impact on scores of CPI and hence lowers the level of corruption. However, 
results of the Hausman test show that data provide evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis (as Hausman test is significant at 1% level of significance) of 
absence of correlation between countries’ unobservable individual effects and 
corruption determinants. Therefore, we can conclude that the most appropriate 
way to carry out analysis of the relationship between CPI and its determinants 
is a panel model with fixed effects. Therefore, in the next step, in the model 3, 
analysis has been conducted with fixed effects but providing the cross-section 
weights. Results of model 3, besides confirming the results reported in model 1, 
show that RL also has significant positive impact on CPI scores and hence 
negative impact on corruption. Further, we have also estimated fixed effect 
model by allowing first-order auto-regressive scheme and results are presented 
under model 4. We found that AR process is stationary; therefore model with 
fixed effect is reliable. Further, we have also tested the stationary property of 
the residuals calculated from models 1 and 3 and found that residuals posses 
stationary property (see Appendix 2).  
In the next step we have analyzed fixed effect model with allowance of 
interaction terms as most of the variables are interrelated. Results of panel data 
analysis with allowance of fixed effect and interaction term with cross-section 
weights are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Regression results of panel data models with interaction effects 
Panel data models: Dependent variable is CPI; standard errors in parenthesis 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables FE-CSW  Varia-
bles 
FE-CSW  Varia-
bles 
FE-CSW  Varia-
bles 
FE-CSW 
VA 
0.318343*** 
(0.067772) VA 
0.441047*** 
(0.094043) VA 
0.457445*** 
(0.095325) VA 
0.471719*** 
(0.105239) 
GE 
-0.052880 
(0.090979) GE 
-0.086634 
(0.091746) GE 
-0.071513 
(0.091501) VA*VA 
-0.451656*** 
(0.100512) 
VA*GE 
0.115486 
(0.078197) VA*GE 
-0.131477 
(0.189942) VA*GE 
-0.154782 
(0.190704) GE 
-0.375048*** 
(0.117970) 
RQ 
0.317842*** 
(0.072476) RQ 
0.387275*** 
(0.072471) RQ 
0.379672*** 
(0.070966) GE*GE 
0.348414*** 
(0.162204) 
VA*RQ 
-0.189558** 
(0.084746) VA*RQ 
-0.569994*** 
(0.194270) VA*RQ 
-0.587886*** 
(0.194097) VA*GE 
0.047146 
(0.230707) 
RL 
0.170664* 
(0.100634) RL 
0.161504 
(0.103124) RL 
0.160361 
(0.102503) RQ 
0.401742*** 
(0.091590) Aviral Kumar Tiwari 
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VA*RL 
-0.093254 
(0.096647) VA*RL 
0.455247** 
(0.209970) VA*RL 
0.410504* 
(0.212940) RQ*RQ 
0.063188 
(0.153753) 
CC 
0.152062** 
(0.066882) CC 
0.055724 
(0.078029) CC 
0.030066 
(0.080205) VA*RQ 
-0.502290** 
(0.238539) 
SSER 
0.001618* 
(0.000849) GE*CC 
0.194633 
(0.136154) VA*CC 
0.096454 
(0.090377) RL 
0.013602 
(0.119225) 
C 
4.476892*** 
(0.093464) RQ*CC 
0.390893*** 
(0.135666) GE*CC 
0.181345 
(0.135277) RL*RL 
-0.514131*** 
(0.168593) 
   RL*CC 
-0.489172*** 
(0.148073) RQ*CC 
0.402343*** 
(0.135713) VA*RL 
0.834175*** 
(0.243261) 
   SSER 
0.000729 
(0.001037) RL*CC 
-0.509815*** 
(0.149863) CC 
0.255984*** 
(0.093248) 
   C 
4.525702*** 
(0.112554) SSER 
0.000781 
(0.001068) GE*CC 
-0.456899** 
(0.252969) 
      C  
4.533835*** 
(0.114627) RQ*CC 
0.293630 
(0.219679) 
          R L *CC 
0.126120 
(0.258432) 
          SSER 
0.000642 
(0.000886) 
          C  
4.728644*** 
(0.107768) 
Model summary  
R2   0.999237    0.999281    0.999289    0.999009 
Country 
included  82   82   82    82 
Total 
observa-
tions  492  492  492    492 
Notes: 1 ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, 
respectively. 2. EF- CSW denotes fixed effect with cross-section weights. 3. * denotes 
interaction between the variables.  
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
It is evident from model 1 of Table 2 that now all variables (VA, RQ, RL, 
CC and SSER) have turned to be significant with positive sign while only RQ is 
insignificant. Further, we also find that effect of VA is conditional upon RQ. 
Form model 2, we find that only VA and RQ have significantly positive impact 
on CPI and hence negative impact on the corruption level. Further, we find that 
impact of VA is conditional upon RQ, impact of RQ and RL is conditional 
upon CC. Evaluation of model 3 reveals that only VA and RQ have significant, 
positive, impact on CPI values and effect of VA is conditional upon RQ and RL 
and impact of RQ and RL is conditional upon CC.  Further, model 4 shows that 
VA, GE, RQ and CC are significant with positive sign (except GE, which has 
negative sign). Addition to that we find that VA is conditional upon RQ, RL 
and CC and GE is conditional upon GE and CC. It is important to note that if 
VACC is significant it will imply both VA is conditional upon CC and CC is Corruption, democracy and bureaucracy  
 
25
conditional upon VA and if VAVA is significant with positive sign (as it is 
not) higher value of VA decreases level of corruption and if coefficients sign is 
negative (as it is) it will show that higher value of VA has positive impact, 
surprisingly, on level of corruption.  So, care should be taken while analyzing 
the results.  
 
5.  Conclusions  
This study is intended to analyze the impact of democracy and 
bureaucracy on corruption in the panel framework of 82 countries for the period 
2002 to 2007. Further, we have also analyzed the interaction effect of the 
various variables. To measure more reliable estimates of democracy and 
bureaucracy we have used few control variables, namely rule of law, regulatory 
quality, control over corruption and secondary enrollment ratio.  Results of 
Hausman test reveals that fixed effect panel data analysis with fixed effect is 
more appropriate. From fixed effect estimates we find that VA, RL and CC 
decrease the level of corruption. When we allowed for interaction effect among 
independent variables we find the evidence of strong interaction effect between 
all of the explanatory variables (interaction effect of SSER with other 
explanatory variable is not analyzed). We also find that, surprisingly, higher 
value of VA that is higher level of democracy and RL that is rule of law are 
associated with higher level of corruption. Further, we also find that higher 
bureaucracy lowers the level of corruption.  
 
 
Note 
 
(1) List of the countries included for the analysis is presented in appendix along with the 
descriptive statistics.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Countries included in the analysis and descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 CPI  VA GE  RQ  RL  CC SERS 
 Mean   4.806911   0.402419   0.440122   0.429492   0.289248   0.318252   84.21590 
 Median   4.100000   0.500000   0.330000   0.440000   0.180000   0.180000   89.33048 
 Maximum   9.700000   1.830000   2.240000   1.910000   1.960000   2.470000   160.3465 
 Minimum   1.200000  -1.910000  -1.180000  -1.740000  -1.660000  -1.510000   17.46335 
 Std. Dev.   2.383812   0.870880   0.974716   0.904897   1.003648   1.061266   26.49836 
 Skewness   0.632058  -0.381851   0.184800  -0.192482   0.113107   0.379733 -0.552445 
 Kurtosis   2.112146   2.218911   1.789603   2.057499   1.758743   1.999843   3.459498 
               
 Jarque-Bera   48.91863   24.46349   32.83415   21.24836   32.63379   32.33060   29.35439 
 Probability   0.000000   0.000005   0.000000   0.000024   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000 
 Sum   2365.000   197.9900   216.5400   211.3100   142.3100   156.5800   41434.22 
 Sum Sq. Dev.   2790.137   372.3902   466.4850   402.0502   494.5884   553.0063   344762.1 
 Observations   492   492   492   492   492   492   492 
 
 
Countries included in the analysis 
Argentina  Czech Republic  Hong Kong  Lithuania  Paraguay  Thailand 
Australia Denmark  Hungary  Luxembourg  Peru  Trinidad & Tobago 
Austria Dominican  Rep.  Iceland  Malawi  Philippines  Tunisia 
Azerbaijan Ecuador  India  Malaysia  Poland  Turkey 
Bangladesh El  Salvador  Indonesia  Mauritius  Portugal  Uganda 
Belarus Estonia  Ireland  Mexico  Romania  Ukraine 
Belgium Ethiopia  Israel  Moldova  Senegal  United Kingdom 
Brazil Finland Italy  Morocco  Slovak Republic  Uruguay 
Bulgaria France  Jamaica  Namibia  Slovenia  USA 
Cameroon Georgia  Japan  Netherlands  South Africa  Uzbekistan 
Chile Germany  Jordan  New Zealand  South Korea  Venezuela 
Colombia Ghana  Kazakhstan  Nicaragua  Spain  Zambia 
Costa Rica  Greece  Kenya  Nigeria  Sweden   
Croatia Guatemala  Latvia  Norway  Switzerland   
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Appendix 2 
Stationary analysis of residuals of models 1 and 3 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary of Model1    
Sample: 2002 2007     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User specified lags at: 1     
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test    
         
         
      Cross-  
Method Statistic  Prob.**  sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -21.0807   0.0000   82   328 
Breitung t-stat  -2.56577   0.0051   82   246 
         
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -20.3269   0.0000   82   328 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   346.032   0.0000   82   328 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   218.514   0.0028   82   410 
         
         
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary of Model 3   
Sample: 2002 2007     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User specified lags at: 1     
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test    
         
         
      Cross-  
Method Statistic  Prob.**  sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -16.9069   0.0000   82   328 
Breitung t-stat  -2.14799   0.0159   82   246 
         
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -13.8300   0.0000   82   328 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square   291.299   0.0000   82   328 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   211.608   0.0072   82   410 
         
         
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic  
        Chi - square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 